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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by S 78-2a3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD)
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to said third degree felony to allow the
Appellant to challenge the Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress.
1. There was insufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle.
Trooper Fox made his determination to stop the tractor-trailer under the misapprehension that he
had the right to stop any tractor-trailer to check the driver's log book. Preserved for appeal at R.
130, p. 7. After the Trooper turned on the Defendant's vehicle and while looking for a place to
stop him, the Trooper observed that one brake light out of four was out on the trailer. Preserved
for appeal at R. 130, p. 7.
Conclusion of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman 846 P.
2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State vs Brown. 852 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). Supporting authorities are:
State vs Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) and Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968).
2. The Utah Highway Patrol Trooper unlawfully detained the Defendant after his initial
reasons for the stop had been concluded. The Trooper's stated reasons for that extended detention
was that he had observed the driver was extremely nervous, and (2) was unresponsive, and had a
physically defective right arm. The drivers inability to carry on a decent conversation; dry mouth
and licking of his lips are all consistent with nervousness. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 42STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, case no. 980375-CA
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47.
Conclusion of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State vs. Thurman 846
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). Supporting authorities are:
State v.Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) and Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968).
3. The State claims two grounds for searching the cab sleeper of the tractor, towit: (1)
probable cause for the officer to believe that CNS stimulants would be in the vehicle (aka the
automobile exception rule), and (2) to conduct an impound inventory.
During the extended detention of Mr. Chevre, the Trooper concluded (based upon some
tests) that Mr. Chevre was under the influence of a CNS stimulant, but failed to articulate his
probable cause for believing that illegal CNS stimulant would be found in the tractor cab.
Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 48-52.
The State failed to introduce the Utah Highway Patrol's impound inventory policies and
therefore failed to establish that Trooper Fox followed such procedures when he searched the
tractor cab. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, p. 53.
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman. supra. Supporting authorities
are: State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 and United
States v. Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
4. In the absence of well established department vehicle impound inventory policies and
procedures authorizing its patrolmen to open sealed packages, it was a violation of the
Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah for Trooper Fox to open the
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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sealed package containing marijuana. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 53-54.
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman. supra. Supporting authorities
are: State v. Schlossen 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). State v. Mendoza. 748 nP.2d 181 and United
States vsHenslev. 469 U.S. 221, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction of a third degree felony, Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, More than One Pound of Marijuana. This conviction is based upon
appellant's conditional plea of guilty to said charge to enable him to appeal the Trial Court's denial
of his motion to suppress. (Addendum)
At the suppression hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that the transcript of the
preliminary hearing should be made a part of the record and considered by the Court as evidence
on the suppression issues. The Court accepted the stipulation. (R. 130, p. 11)
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS
The controlling statutes and constitutional provisions are found in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 18,1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox pulled over a west bound tractor
trailer on U.S. Highway 89 in Kanab, Utah. (R. 131, p. 75,11. 15-25) The tractor was being
driven by the Defendant and the only other occupant was a male in the passenger seat. (R. 131,
pp. 9-12 and p. 42,11. 17-20). The Trial Court made the followingfindingsof fact regarding the
Troopers grounds for making the stop.
* **

4. Tooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to check
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, case no. 980375-CA
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the driver's log book.
5. As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull over the
tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on the trailer
6. Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the driver's log book
and conduct a mechanical inspection. (R. 103)

The trailer had four brake lights, two on each side.(R. 130, p. 16)1
Once the Trooper had made the stop, he talked to the driver (William Chevre) and noticed
that Mr. Chevre was "pretty" nervous arid that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive and there
seemed to be a physical defect of some type.(R. 131, pp. 13-14) At about that time, the Trooper
began to ask the Defendant questions relating to his log book and registration permits. (R. 131, pp.
13-14) The Trooper then ask the Defendant out of the tractor to show him that the break light
was out and a leaking oil seal. (R. 131, 14-15) The Trooper had observed Mr. Chevre's extreme
nervous condition; his inability to carry on a decent conversation, his cotton or dry mouth and
continual licking of his lips. (R. 131, p. 15,11.19-24) The Trooper then invited Mr. Chevre into the
Trooper's truck. The Trooper's purpose in having Mr. Chevre get into the Trooper's truck was to
"... kind of go over the log book and have more discussion. "(R. 131, pp. 15-16,11.15-1)
Once the Trooper had Mr. Chevre in the Highway Patrol truck, Trooper Fox ask Mr. Chevre

l

. Section 41-6-121.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) provides: "Every motor
vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or more stop lamps
meeting the requirements of the department, provided the department may by rule allow one stop
lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it was made." ( emphasis added)(R. 131, p.7,
11.21-22)

STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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to do some drug recognition tests (hereafter DRE) for the following reasons: inability to carry on
a good conversation; cotton mouth, dry lips, his very nervous condition ("... his foot was-was
virtually bouncing off thefloorwhile he was seated in the vehicle.") and somewhat inconsistent
answers on his where he had been. (R. 131, p. 17)
The Trooper then ask Mr. Chevre to engage in some drug recognition tests. (R. 131, p. 18,11.
19-22) The drug recognition tests were then performed. (R. 131, pp. 19,22-37) At the time,
Trooper Fox had completed a drug recognition course, but did not hold a drug recognition
evaluator's certificate because copies of the evaluations had not been sent in to the instructors and
he had not sent in a resume. (R. 131, pp.21-22) Based on his training and the DRE evaluations,
Trooper Fox determined that Mr. Chevre was under the influence of the central nervous system
stimulant and placed him under arrest. (R. 131, p.37) The only violation the Trooper initially
arrested the Defendant for was for driving under the influence (of drugs). (R. 131, pp. 38,11. 243)

Trooper Fox then opened and looked into the trailer. (R. 131, p. 89) Then he went to the

cab of the tractor; entered, immediately opened the curtain to the closed off sleeper area (R. 131,
p. 40,11. 12-19), lifted up some blankets, saw some bundles wrapped in plastic and tore the corner
off of one bundle revealing a green leafy substance with the appearance of marijuana. (R. 131,
pp. 40-42 13-14)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I: The Utah Highway Patrolman stopped the tractor trailer being operated by Mr.
Chevre for two reasons as follows: (1) to check his log book, and (2) the trailer had a brake light
out. Apparently Trooper Fox was operating under a misapprehension that he had statutory
authority to stop any and all commercial vehicles to check their log books.. There were four brake
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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lights on the rear of the tailer and section 41-6-121.00, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
only requires two brake lights on the rear of a vehicle. Therefore, Trooper Fox had insufficient
reasonable suspicion or grounds to make the stop.
POINT II: The Trooper detained Mr. Chevre for further investigation after he had
concluded his business regarding his stated reasons for the stop. After Trooper Fox had checked
the log book and had shown Mr. Chevre the mechanical defects, he should have warned Mr.
Chevre and sent him on his way.
POINT III: The investigation, "drug recognition evaluation" (DRE), that took place
thereafter was not justified by the Trooper's observations that Mr. Chevre had a physical defect
and displayed characteristics of nervousness. Therefore, Mr. Chevre's arrest was not justified and
the search of the tractor trailer cannot be supported on the theory of search incident to arrest. The
inability of Trooper Fox to articulate why any of his observations provided him with any probable
cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor, is grounds for the Court to
suppress the evidence found in the tractor. Further, Trooper Fox should have obtained a search
warrant since the tractor trailer was not going anywhere and other officers were there to secure
the tractor and its contents.
POINT IV: No Utah Highway Patrol impound inventory policies and procedures were
received into evidence. Trooper Fox claims that he tore open one of the bundles he found under
the covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory. According to Bertine.
infra, and Shamblin. infra, and since Trooper Fox did not follow department standardized
procedures in doing so, the marijuana should be suppressed. Those case require that standardized
policies and procedures be followed by law enforcement officers when they inventory the contents
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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of a vehicle pursuant to an impound.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND
EVEN IF THERE WAS, SHOULD THE TROOPER HAVE TERMINATED THE
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION WHEN THE REASONS FOR THE STOP HAD BEEN
DEALT WITH.
In this case trooper Fox made his determination to stop the Defendant's vehicle under the
misapprehension that he had therightto stop any tractor trailer to check its log book. After a
thorough search of the Utah Code, this author has concluded that nowhere in Utah law is a police
officer authorized to stop a commercial or any vehicle for the purpose of checking a truck driver's
log book. This author believes that the prosecution will concede that point.
After having made that erroneous decision and while following the tractor trailer looking for a
place to pull it over, the Trooper noticed that a break light was out. Therefore, the question is as
follows: Having determined to stop the vehicle on fallacious ground, is an after observed
mechanical defect justification for an officer to stop the vehicle? After exhaustive research, this
author has found no authority that is determinative. In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994),
where the facts are similar to the instant case (but missing one fact), the Supreme Court held that
an observed traffic violation (including a mechanical) defect is grounds for an officer to stop a
vehicle. However, the missing fact is that the officer in (Lopez, supra), did not admit that he had
formed the intent to stop before observing the mechanical problem. Therefore, the Defendant
urges the Court to conclude that the Trooper would not have turned on the Defendant's vehicle
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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(commenced investigative procedures) had he not been mistaken as to the law and therefore, the
stop was improper.
This Memorandum will leave that question unresolved and turn to the next issue which may
well render the previous question moot. That is: Did the Defendant' detention extend beyond the
time needed to clear the situation leading to the stop?
POINT II
DID THE TROOPER UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE DEFENDANT AFTER HIS INITIAL
REASONS FOR THE STOP HAD BEEN CONCLUDED.
Based upon the Trooper's sole remaining reason for the stop, towit: defective brake light, the
encounter should have concluded with the Trooper issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for
defective equipment unless the Trooper could articulate observations arising prior thereto that
gave rise to independent reasonable suspicion to pursue an investigation into the sleeping
compartment of the tractor. The Trooper failed to so articulate.
From the facts it would appear that the appropriate time for the Trooper to terminate the
detention would have been right after he had the driver out of the tractor and had shown him the
oil leak and the defective break light.
The following is what had occurred prior to that point: the Trooper had made the stop;
approached the cab, talked to the driver, observed that the driver was pretty nervous, that his left
arm was unresponsive which the Trooper characterized as a physical defect, and had asked about
the log book and registration permits. Also, by that time, the Trooper had probably observed
what he characterized as the Defendant's "kind of...inability to carry on a decent conversation,"(R.
131, p. 15), his dry mouth and the licking of his lips. It was at this point where the Trooper could
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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have and should have cited or warned Mr. Chevre for defective equipment.
The drivers inability to carry on a decent conversation; dry mouth and licking of his lips
are all consistent with nervousness. Neither nervousness nor a physically defective left arm give
rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Chevre was engaged in criminal conduct. That
leaves extreme nervousness as the reason for the stop.
In State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the following facts were at hand: The
officer observed the driver doing 42 mph in a 35 mph zone, while stopping the vehicle he
observed the passenger of the pickup bending over, acting fidgety, turning left to right, and
turning back to look at the officer. Also, when the stop was made, the driver met the officer
between the two vehicles and the passenger continued to move about in the cab causing the
officer to conclude that the passenger was trying to hide something. The officer then approached
the passenger door; tapped on the window and immediately opened the door whereupon the
officer saw marijuana and paraphernalia in the cab in plain view. In that case (Schlosser. supra),
the Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial court's suppression of the evidence and in doing so
wrote the following:
* **

The state argues that the officer's opening the door constituted
an extension of an "investigative detention" and that the officer's
actions were lawful because defendants' activities gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion either of criminal activities or of danger to
the officer's personal safety. Therefore, the State asserts that
the judge erroneously applied a probable cause standard instead
of a reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing
on the motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's
action of opening the car door constituted a search, not an
investigative detention, and therefore, the probable cause
standard was correctly applied by the trial court. However,
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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even if the State's premise were accepted that no search
occurred, the facts do not support a reasonable and
articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's
action of opening the car door constituted a search, not
an investigative detention, and therefore, the probable
cause standard was correctly applied by the trial court.
However, even if the State's premise were accepted that
no search occurred, the facts do not support a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity
which is necessary to support the State's position. See
State v. Dorsey. (Citation omitted); State v. Carpena.
(Citation omitted); State v Swanagan. (Citation
omitted).
An investigative detention is justified if a police officer
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's
occupants are "involved in criminal activity." United States v.
Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604
(1985); Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1087, 1090. Additionally, an
officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable
belief that the suspect is dangerous and "may gain immediate
control of weapons." Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049,
103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In such
instances, "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's]
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Here, Officer Howard had no probable cause, and no
articulable suspicion either that his safety was in danger or that
the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. He cited no
safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he sought only to
investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in
illegal activity, and for that reason he opened the passenger
door. Compare United States v. Pajari. 715 F.2d 1378, 1382
(8th Cir. 1983) (driver's nervousness coupled with information
from multiple informants and previous police observations
provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for investigative
stop) with Jones v. United States. 391 A.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C.
1978) (furtive gestures by a passenger and location of vehicle
and time of stop did not "rise to the level of articulable
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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suspicion").
Officer Howard's testimony does not support an
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere furtive gestures
of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an
articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. See People v.
Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d at 821-24, 478 P.2d
at 457-59, 91 Cal.Rptr. at 737-39 (passenger's actions of
turning and putting her arm over the back of the seat, then
facing forward, bending down towards floor, and then resuming
normal position did not support probable cause to search);
Spence v. State. 525 So.2d 442 (Fla.App. 1988) (leaning down
as if putting something onfloorboarddid not justify officer's
suspicion); People v. Mills. 115 111. App. 3d 809, 71 Ill.Dec.
247, 450 N.E.2d 935 (1983) (defendant's fast movements and
leaning forward as officer approached did not create reasonable
suspicion).
Schlosser's movements, turning to the left and to the
right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at
the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility
that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur.
Schlosser may have been attempting to locate a driver's license.
He could have been preparing for conversation with the officer
by turning down the volume on the radio or extinguishing a
cigarette. He may also have been putting away food and
beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking
brake or doing a host of other innocuous things. When
confronted with a traffic stopr it is not uncommon for drivers
and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to
look at an approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza.
748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987). A search based on such
common gestures and movements is a mere "hunch." not an
articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment,
(emphasis added.)
A driver's leaving the vehicle to talk to the officer, as
Lowder did, is also reasonable behavior and not indicative of
criminal conduct. Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. at 110,
states that a driver's exiting his vehicle to talk with a police
officer may actually be safer for the officer than for him to talk
to the driver who remains inside the vehicle. See also People v.
Superior Court. 3 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 478 P.2d at 462, 91 Cal.
STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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Rptr. at 742. Officer Howard did not point to anything
which made Lowder's exiting the truck unusual or
suspicious. Lowder had his driver's license and
registration in hand, but that is neither unreasonable nor
so suspicious as to give rise to an inference of illegal
activity.
In short, the trial court did not err in ruling that the facts
do not support an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. [5]
(emphasis added)

Another way to analyze the "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" issue is the ask the
following question: At the point where the Trooper had shown Mr. Chevre the mechanical defect,
what had the Trooper observed that would give rise to reasonable suspicion of what criminal
activity? The answer is NONE. What criminal activity? NONE. Based on Trooper Fox's
observation up to that point, no reasonable person and no reasonable police officer could have
articulated in what criminal activity Mr. Chevre was suspected of being engaged.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the Trooper should have terminated his detention at
that point by issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment. It also follows
that the investigation (DRE) that took place thereafter was unjustified and that the Defendant's
arrest as a result thereof was improper.
POINT III
WAS THE SEARCH JUSTIFIED BY THE "PROBABLE CAUSE"; "IMPOUND
INVENTORY", OR "SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST" EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH
WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION.

STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, case no. 980375-CA

Page Number 12

The State claims two grounds for searching the cab sleeper of the tractor, towit: (1)
probable cause for the officer to believe that CNS stimulants would be in the vehicle (aka the
automobile exception rule), and (2) to conduct an impound inventory. (R. 131, p.40, 11.2)
Implicit in Trooper Fox's testimony is the additional grounds of search incident to arrest.
First follows an analysis of the Trooper's reasonable suspicion to believe that a CNS
stimulant would be found in the cab or sleeper.
After the DRE, Trooper Fox, arguendo, had reasons to believe that Mr. Chevre was under
the influence of a central nervous system (CNS) stimulant he arrested the Defendant and searched
the sleeper compartment of the cab. However, one must ask, whether that gives rise to a
reasonable belief that CNS stimulants would be found in the vehicle. Based on Trooper Fox's
observations of the Defendant, Trooper Fox formed a suspicion that Mr. Chevre was under the
influence of a CNS stimulant, i.e., that Chevre had ingested a CNS stimulant. Nowhere does
Trooper Fox articulate why that would make him think that such a stimulant would be found in
the vehicle. Further, there is at least one legal CNS stimulant, towit: caffeine. (R. 131, pp. 84,
11. 22-25 through 85, 11. 1-7)
* **

..., even if the circumstances are such that the police are
excused from the necessity of having a search warrant for an
automobile, they are nonetheless authorized to conduct a search
of a vehicle for evidence only if they possess probable cause that
particular items of evidence are presently concealed therein,
(emphasis added)

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure. Second Edition 1987, section 5.2 (c).
An example of where the Court found such sufficient probable cause is U.S. v. Jones. 452
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F.2d 884 (8th Cir, 1971). In that case the Defendant was stopped after he made an illegal turn;
ran a red light while driving a car without a plate and when the officer approached he saw the
Defendant tear up a piece of paper and push the pieces between the seat and the cushion. When
the officer retrieved the torn pieces of paper they turned out to be a stolen welfare check. In
other words, the officer articulated probable cause to believe that the Defendant was hiding
contraband.
It has been well established since Chimel v. California. 395 US 752, (S.Ct. 1969) that
because of the moveable nature of automobiles, under certain circumstances a search warrant may
not be required. One of those circumstances is that the officers can articulate probable cause to
believe that particular items of contraband may be located in the vehicle. Observations of the
Trooper that, arguendo, caused him to reasonably believe that Mr. Chevre was under the
influence of a CNS stimulant are not grounds for him to believe that he would find such a
substance in Defendant's vehicle. To the contrary, such a finding by Trooper Fox would
reasonably cause him to believe that Mr. Chevre had ingested a CNS stimulant. The absence of
any attempt by Trooper Fox to articulate why any of his observations (prior to the search)
provided him with probable cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor,
should give the Court pause in concluding that he had probable cause to believe that illegal CNS
stimulants might be found in the vehicle.
However, probable cause is not the only requirement of the "automobile exception" rule.
In State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court clearly outlined
the requirements of the "automobile exception" rule in Utah, as follows:
* **
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... there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained,
(emphasis added)

For this exception to apply, the police must have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a
crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized. ... (emphasis
added)

In the instant case the last requirement is missing. The tractor was not going anywhere. The
driver and the passenger could be secured (R. 131, p. 42,11. 8-23); the trooper could have and
should have secured the keys and the tractor. Also, a second officer was present (R. 131, p. 10,
11. 10-15) and a third officer arrived before Trooper Fox left the scene of the stop. (R. 131, 100,
11. 12-20)
The United States Supreme Court defines probable cause as facts and circumstances
within (the officers') knowledge sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. See United States vs Cortez. 449 U.S. 411,
417-418 (1981). The State bears the burden of establishing both probable cause and exigent
circumstances in order for a warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception under Art.
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, State v. Larrocco. 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990).
In State vs Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that troopers did not
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify continued detention and
questioning of defendants once a warning citation was given and purpose for initial stop had been
accomplished. In Robinson, Defendants appealed their conviction of unlawful possession of a
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controlled substance found while troopers were conducting a routine traffic stop. Officers stopped
the vehicle for improper passing. The officers made a routine check on the driver's license and
vehicle registration and found the vehicle was not registered to either of the occupants. The
defendants explained that their boss at a floor covering business had allowed then to take the
work van on a two week fishing trip to Wyoming. While checking out their story, the officers
noted the nervousness of the occupants, and observed that a homemade bed, two feet high, filled
the back of the vehicle. Based on what they observed the trooper determined to ask for consent to
search the vehicle. Id., at 433. The Defendant, Robinson, consented and the troopers observed
five marijuana seeds in the rear corner of the van. When the officers failed to get consent from
Robinson to look under the bed, the officers stated that they would attempt to get a search
warrant. Officer Ogden then asked Robinson, "Since you won't let us take the plywood panel off
the van to look under the bed, would it be all right if we let a dog go through the vehicle?"
Robinson replied, "yes" and asked if allowing the dog to sniflF meant giving consent to search. The
Officer said "yes" and Robinson shook his head affirmatively. The defendants were later arrested
when the dog gave a positive alert at the rear of the bed and trooper located eight duffel bags of
marijuana in the space under the bed. Id., at 434. The court concluded the in light of the troopers'
questioning and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time, and the other surrounding
circumstances, the State had not borne its burden that consent to search the vehicle was
voluntary. They reached the same conclusion about Robinson's subsequent consent to allow the
narcotics dog to search the van interior. Id., at 438
The issue raised by this Defendant is not a "consent" issue, however, the analysis used by
the Robinson (supra) Court is applicable to the facts of this case.
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Trooper Fox testified that the first thing he did after arresting Mr. Chevre was to open the
trailer to look for evidence of CNS stimulants]. (R. 131, 89,11. 2-17) The next thing that
Trooper Fox did was enter the cab of the Tractor, going immediately to the sleeper. Trooper Fox
testified that the first thing that he did upon entering the cab was to open the curtains to the
sleeper. (R. 131, p.40,11. 12-19). Trooper Fox never articulated why he thought drugs would be
found in the cab of the tractor or in the sleeping compartment.

POINT IV
IN THE ABSENCE OF WELL ESTABLISHED IMPOUND INVENTORY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES AUTHORIZING THE OFFICER TO OPEN SEALED PACKAGES, IS IT A
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR THE OFFICER TO
OPEN THE SAME.
Trooper Fox characterized his search of the cab of the tractor as being an impound inventory.
(R 131, p.90,11. 5-14) It is a well founded constitutional principle that a police officer may not
open sealed or closed containers during an impound inventory unless he is acting in accordance
with standardized, specific department procedure mandating the opening of all such containers.
See Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367 (1987) and State v. Shamblin. 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App.
1988). Pursuant to Trooper Fox's "impound inventory" of the sleeper compartment of the cab of
the tractor, he tore open the corner of a bundle wrapped in plastic and observed marijuana therein.
(R. 131, p. 41) Since this was a warrantless search, the burden is upon the state to establish that
the Trooper followed such standardized and specific department procedures. (State v. Shamblin.
supra). No such department written policies and procedures were received into evidence at the
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preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing held in this case. There is nothing in the transcript
that even suggests whether or not the Utah Highway Patrol's policies and procedures regarding
impound inventory procedures requires its officers to open closed packages and/or containers.
Thus the State has completely failed to meet its burden in that regard and as a result the Court has
no choice but to suppress the marijuana evidence in this case.
The Utah Court of Appeals at page 3 of the (Shamblin case, supra), clearly sets forth its
reasoning for said result, as follows:
*

* * *

We read Bertine to establish that the Fourth Amendment is
violated if closed containers are opened during a vehicle inventory search in
the absence of a standardized, specific procedure mandating their opening.
Such a procedure precludes the possibility that officers conducting
inventory searches will act arbitrarily and only selectively open containers.
Further, such a procedure insulates police from claim that, in a particular
case, their opening closed containers was nothing more than a 'fishing
expedition.' It also promotes a certain equality of treatment....

In any event, Trooper Fox claims that he tore open (searched) the bundle he found under the
covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory and according to (Bertine.
supra), and (Shamblin, supra), the marijuana must be suppressed for lack of evidence that he
followed a written standardized department policy requiring that he open all such containers.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Highway Patrolman lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the
Appellant's vehicle. Based upon the Trooper's alleged reason for the stop, towit: (1) to check the
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log book and (2) defective brake light, the encounter should have concluded with the Trooper
issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment.
It is respectfully submitted that the Trooper should have terminated Mr. Chevre's
detention at that point by issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment. It
also follows that the investigation (DRE) that took place thereafter was unjustified and that the
Defendant's arrest as a result thereof was improper. The absence of any attempt by Trooper Fox
to articulate why any of his observations (prior to the search) provided him with any probable
cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor, is the grounds for the Court
to suppress the evidence found in the tractor. Further, Trooper Fox should have obtained a
search warrant since the tractor trailer was not going anywhere and other officers were there to
secure the tractor and its contents.
The Bertine. supra, rule requires officers to follow written standardized department policy
when doing an inventory of an impounded vehicle. No evidence was presented to show what
those policies were. Thus the evidence seized from the sleeper compartment should be
suppressed.
Trooper Fox claims that he tore open (searched) one of the bundles he found under the
covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory and according to Bertine.
/

/

/

STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, case no. 980375-CA

Page Number 19

supra, and Shamblin. supra, and since he did not follow department standardized procedures in
doing so, the marijuana must be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this Z3?day of December, 1998.
7c*S*~^€*\

Jim R. Scarth,
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY/FAXING/MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two full, true, correct copies of the above and foregoing
document was
hand delivered,
faxed and/or ^ m a i l e d , first class mail, postage
Aa
fully prepaid, thisx23 aay of December, 1998, to: Jan Graham, Attorney General, at: 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114.
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ADDENDUM

STATE vs WILLIAM CHEVRE
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
\
]|

Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
i case No. 951600068
]
| JUDGE K. L. McIFF

WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995,
pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Suppress.

The State of Utah

was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney.
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R.
Scarth.

The parties presented evidence and argued their

respective positions.

Counsel then requested that they be

allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their
respective positions.

On November 22, 1996, the matter came

before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the
STATE OF UTAH v. WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE

Court's decision.

The Court, having heard the testimony, having

reviewed the parties' memoranda, and having heard the arguments
of counsel, now therefore enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 18, 1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox

pulled over a westbound tractor trailer on U.S. Highway 8 9 in
Kanab, Utah.
2.

The tractor was being driven by the Defendant, and the

only other occupant was an adult male in the passenger seat.
3.

Trooper Fox was accompanied by State Safety Inspector

David Shiers.
4.

Trooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to

check the driver's log book.
5.

As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull

over the tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on
the trailer.
6.

Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the

driver's log book and conduct a mechanical inspection.
7.

Once Trooper Fox made the stop, he talked to the

Defendant, and noticed that the Defendant was "pretty" nervous,
that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive, and that the
Defendant seemed to have a physical defect of some type.

STATE OF UTAH v. WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE
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Trooper

Fox noticed that the Defendant's foot "was virtually bouncin' off
the floor."
8.

Trooper Fox began to ask the Defendant questions

relating to his log book and permits.
9.

Trooper Fox observed the Defendant's extreme nervous

condition, his- inability to carry on a decent conversation, his
cotton mouth or dry mouth, and his continual licking of his lips.
10.

Trooper Fox asked the Defendant to get out of the

tractor to show him the inoperable brake light, and a leaking oil
seal, and to review the log book and have more discussion.
11.

Once Trooper Fox had the Defendant in his patrol

vehicle, he asked the Defendant to perform some drug recognition
tests for the following reasons: inability to carry on a
conversation, cotton mouth, dry lips, very nervous condition, and
somewhat inconsistent answers regarding his whereabouts.
12.

The Defendant complied, and performed some of the drug

recognition tests.
13.

At the time, although Trooper Fox had completed a drug

recognition course, he did not hold a drug recognition
evaluator's certificate because copies of the evaluations he had
performed as part of his training had not been sent in to the
instructors, and because he had not yet sent in a resume.
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14.

Based on his training and the drug recognition

evaluation, Trooper Fox determined that the Defendant was under
the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.
15.

Trooper Fox then placed the Defendant under arrest for

driving under the influence of drugs.
16.

After placing the Defendant under arrest, Trooper Fox

opened and looked into the trailer.
17.

The passenger did not have a commercial driver's

license.
18.

Trooper Fox then returned to the tractor to search for

a central nervous stimulant and to conduct an inventory search,
because the truck was going to be impounded.
19.

Upon returning to the tractor, Trooper Fox opened the

curtain to the sleeper area, saw something large under some
blankets, and removed the blankets, all to ensure that no one was
in the sleeper area.
20.

Instead of finding a person, Trooper Fox found several

large bundles wrapped in contact paper.
21.

Trooper Fox tore open the corner of one bundle, having

assumed the contents to be marijuana, based on training he had
received.
22.

Ultimately, the bundles were weighed, and found to

contain 159.04 kilograms (350.6 pounds) of marijuana.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial stop of the tractor trailer was legitimate

because of the defective brake light on the trailer.

Trooper

Fox's decision to stop the tractor trailer to examine the
driver's log book, which was made prior to the discovery of the
defective brake light, does not adversely affect the legitimacy
of the stop.
2.

Based on Defendant's noted physical characteristics

while Trooper Fox was at the tractor door, i.e., Defendant's
nervous condition, his "kinda" unresponsive arm, his bouncing
foot, his inability to carry on a conversation, his cotton mouth
or dry mouth, the continual licking of his lips, and his
inconsistent answers about his whereabouts, Trooper Fox was
justified in asking Defendant out of the tractor, and was
justified in having Defendant perform the drug recognition tests.
3.

After Defendant was arrested for driving under the

influence of a central nervous stimulant, it was reasonable for
Trooper Fox to return to the tractor to perform an inventory
search of the tractor.
4.

It was reasonable for Trooper Fox to open the curtain

to the tractor's sleeper area, and to remove the blankets to
ensure that no one was under them.
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5.

Based on Trooper Fox's training, it was reasonable for

him to tear the corner of one of the bundles to examine the
contents.

(2^

tk^-

DATED this M*tt day of November, 1997.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of May, 1997, I served a true
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below.
Jim R. Scarth
P. 0. Box 160
St. George, UT 84771

(via hand delivery)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the A3
day of JWuvambLf, 1997, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. 0. Box 160
St. George, UT 84771

(via first class mail)

^y?('MUJ^'/^U^

STATE OF UTAH v. WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE
r»*er«

vrn

QRicnnnzR

COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
,
)
;
1
]

v.
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE,
Defendant.

Case No. 951600068
JUDGE K. L. McIFF

This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995,
pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The State of Utah

was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney.
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R.
Scarth.

The parties presented evidence and argued their

respective positions.

Counsel then requested that they be

allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their
respective positions.

On November 22, 1996, the matter came

before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the
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Court's decision.

The Court heard the testimony, reviewed the

parties' memoranda, heard the arguments of counsel, and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is
denied.

DATED this 1^-—day of <N©^etTtb^r, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

K. L. Me^FF
District Court Judge,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of May, 1997, I served a true
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. 0. Box 160
St. George, UT 84 771

(via hand delivery)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the /£2 day of^tfe^efrBer, 1997, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. O. Box 160
St. George, UT 84771

(via first class mail)
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CONVICTION ORDER

Case No. 951600068
JUDGE K. L. McIFF

This matter came before the Court for a change of plea on
May 15, 1998.

The State of Utah was represented by the Kane

County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester.

The Defendant was present

and was represented by counsel, Jim R. Scarth.

The State moved

to amend Count 1 of the Information to charge Unlawful Possession
of a Controlled Substance, More Than One Pound of Marijuana, a
Third Degree Felony, and that motion was granted by the Court.
The Defendant pleaded conditionally guilty to Amended Count 1,
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
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suppress.

The State moved to dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, and

that motion was granted by the Court.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant's conditional plea of guilty is freely and

voluntarily made, and it is ordered that the Defendant's
conditional plea, as set forth herein, be accepted and entered.
2.

Sentencing is stayed until Defendant's appeal of the

denial of the motion to suppress is resolved.
3.

Defendant shall remain free on bail pending further

action in this matter.
4.

Defendant has 3 0 days from May 15, 1998, to move to

withdraw his conditional plea of guilty, and 30 days from date
hereof in which to file his appeal.

DATED this

\\J

day of June, 1998.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 21st day of May, 1998, I served a true
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing CONVICTION ORDER to
each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84770

(via first class mail)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the / Q { \ day of June, 1998, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing CONVICTION ORDER to
each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84770

(via first class mail)

Adult Probation and Parole
835 East 300 North #500
Richfield, Utah 84701

(via first class mail)

Kane County Sheriff
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via hand delivery)
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Art. I,

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

